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Abstract:	  
The	   paper	   proposes	   an	   alternative	   benchmark	   to	   the	   EURIBOR	   to	   analyze	   the	   post-­‐crisis	  
puzzling	  behavior	  of	  deposit	   rates	   in	   the	   Eurozone.	  Using	  bank-­‐level	  CDS	  data	   for	  6	  major	  
euro-­‐countries,	  we	  build	  a	  simple	  country-­‐level	   index	  for	  banks’	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding.	  
The	  use	  of	   this	   index	   instead	  of	   the	   traditionally	  used	  EURIBOR	   restores	   the	   cointegration	  
relationship	  between	  deposit	  rates	  and	  their	  reckoned	  opportunity	  cost.	  It	  also	  suggests	  that	  
deposits	  have	  actually	  not	  been	  significantly	  over-­‐remunerated	  in	  most	  euro	  area	  countries	  
since	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  in	  contrast	  with	  what	  is	  often	  argued.	  Our	  index	  appears	  as	  a	  good	  
alternative	  to	  the	  EURIBOR,	  which	  we	  show	  has	  become	  irrelevant	  for	  many	  countries.	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1.	  Introduction	  
	  
In	   this	   study,	  we	   focus	   on	   the	  main	   instrument	   of	   bank	   funding	   in	   the	   Eurozone,	   namely	  
deposits	  from	  non-­‐banks	  (European	  Central	  Bank4,	  2012a)5.	  A	  puzzling	  feature	  about	  banks	  
deposits	   is	   that	   they	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  remunerated	  at	  relatively	  high	  rates	  compared	  to	  
bank’s	   wholesale	   funding	   costs	   since	   the	   2008	   financial	   crisis.	   Deposit	   rates,	   which	   were	  
closely	   following	   the	   Euro	   Interbank	  Offered	   Rate	   (EURIBOR	  henceforth)	   before	   the	   crisis,	  
have	   diverged	   substantially	   from	   it	   since	   then	   (Figure	   1).	   Banks	   thus	   seem	   to	   have	   been	  
willing	   or	   constrained	   to	   pay	   more	   for	   deposits	   than	   what	   they	   pay	   for	   funding	   on	   the	  
wholesale	  market.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  for	  periphery	  countries	  (Figure	  7	  and	  8,	  Appendix	  
1).	  In	  an	  economy	  such	  as	  the	  Eurozone	  where	  banks	  are	  the	  main	  vector	  of	  monetary	  policy	  
transmission	  and	  where	  high	  bank	  funding	  costs	  have	  been	  a	  key	  factor	  preventing	  lending	  
rates	  from	  adjusting	  downwards	  (Illes	  et	  al.,	  2015),	  the	  issue	  appears	  of	  prime	  importance.	  
	  




Few	   papers	   mention	   explanations	   for	   this	   post-­‐crisis	   phenomenon.	   ECB	   (2012a)	   and	   ECB	  
(2009)	  mention	  the	  persistent	  risks	  on	  unsecured	  funding,	  pushing	  banks	  to	  attract	  deposits	  
at	   higher	   prices.	   ECB	   (2012a)	   also	   insists	   on	   the	   regulation	   incentives	   to	   increase	   stable	  
source	  of	  funding.	  Daracq	  Paries	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  mention	  banks’	  reluctance	  to	  pass	  low	  rates	  on	  
their	  depositors.	  
This	  paper	   takes	  another	  approach	  and	  argues	   that	   this	   “puzzle”	   is	  mainly	  due	   to	   the	   fact	  
that	  the	  EURIBOR	  has	  become	  an	  inappropriate	  proxy	  for	  banks	  wholesale	  funding	  costs,	  and	  
thus	   has	   become	   irrelevant	   as	   a	   benchmark.	   The	   reason	   for	   the	   use	   of	   EURIBOR	   as	   a	  
benchmark	  is	  that	  banks	  traditionally	  price	  deposits	  relative	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  ECB	  henceforth.	  
5	   At	   the	   end	   of	   2011,	   non-­‐bank	   deposits	  were	   on	   average	   about	   35%	  of	   banks	   liabilities,	  with	   a	  median	   value	   reaching	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(Cadamagnani	  et	  al.,	  2015;	  Sander	  and	  Kleimeier,	  2004).	  This	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding	  was	  
tightly	  linked	  to	  EURIBOR	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  banks	  before	  the	  crisis,	  but	  it	  then	  substantially	  
diverged	  from	  it	  as	  bank	  funding	  conditions	  became	  severely	  heterogeneous	  (ECB,	  2012b).	  In	  
effect,	   this	  means	   that	   the	   cost	  of	  unsecured	   funding	   for	   Spanish	  banks	   for	   instance	  have	  
substantially	  diverged	  from	  the	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding	  for	  German	  banks	  after	  the	  crisis.	  
Using	  the	  EURIBOR	  for	  these	  two	  countries	  will	   lead	  one	  to	  misleadingly	  assume	  similar	  or	  
connected	  costs	  of	  funds,	  thereby	  leading	  to	  distorted	  conclusions.	  	  
Using	   the	   standard	   theory	  on	   the	   structure	  of	   interest	   rates,	  we	  build	   an	   index	   for	  banks’	  
cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding	  at	  the	  country-­‐level,	  using	  a	  risk-­‐free	  rate	  and	  a	  weighted	  average	  
of	  banks’	  risks	  premium	  (as	  measured	  by	  their	  CDS).	  This	  index	  is	  very	  close	  to	  the	  EURIBOR	  
before	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis	  in	  each	  country	  we	  analyze	  (Figure	  2),	  but	  then	  substantially	  
diverges	  from	  it	  in	  most	  countries,	  especially	  for	  periphery-­‐countries.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Authors’	  index	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding	  versus	  EURIBOR	  
	  
Source:	  Authors’	  sample,	  ECB	  
	  
We	  obtain	   two	   results	   from	   the	   use	   of	   our	   index.	   First,	   the	   use	   of	   our	   index	   restores	   the	  
cointegration	  relationship	  between	  deposit	   rates	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding.	  Panel	  
cointegration	   tests	   indeed	   fail	   in	   the	   post	   crisis	   period	   with	   the	   EURIBOR,	   but	   lead	   the	  
expected	   result	   with	   our	   index.	   Running	   similar	   tests	   at	   the	   country-­‐level	   shows	   that	   the	  
relationship	   with	   the	   EURIBOR	   has	   become	   especially	   irrelevant	   for	   periphery	   countries,	  
unlike	  the	  relationship	  with	  our	  index.	  Our	  index	  thus	  appears	  as	  a	  more	  relevant	  benchmark	  
than	   the	   EURIBOR	   to	   understand	   deposit	   pricing	   in	   the	   Eurozone.	   Second,	   the	   use	   of	   our	  
index	   shows	   that	   deposits	   have	   not	   been	   significantly	   over-­‐remunerated	   since	   the	   2008	  
financial	   crisis,	   unlike	   what	   is	   commonly	   argued.	   Building	   counterfactuals	   rates	   from	  
standard	  panel	  models,	  we	  show	  that	  72%	  of	  the	  seemingly	  “over-­‐remuneration”	  of	  deposits	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The	  rest	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  organized	  as	  follows:	  section	  2	  presents	  the	  conventional	  theoretical	  
framework	  for	  deposit	  pricing,	  reviews	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  EURIBOR	  and	  explains	  how	  
we	   build	   our	   index.	   Section	   3	   presents	   the	   data	   and	   the	   empirical	   method.	   Section	   4	  




2. Theoretical	  considerations	  	  
	  
	  
2.1 The	  conventional	  framework	  for	  deposit	  pricing	  
	  
It	  is	  common	  in	  academic	  studies	  since	  the	  work	  of	  Cottarelli	  and	  Kourelis	  (1994)	  at	  least	  to	  
link	  deposit	  or	   lending	   rates	   to	  money	  market	   rates,	   the	   later	  being	   considered	  as	  a	  good	  
proxy	  for	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  funding.	  In	  the	  conventionally	  used	  model,	  the	  bank	  interest	  
rate	  (BR)	  is	  set	  by	  banks	  depending	  on	  a	  marginal	  cost	  price	  (MC):	  
	  
BR	  =	  θ0	  +	  θMC	  
	  
The	  coefficient	  θ0	  is	  a	  markup	  over	  the	  banks’	  marginal	  costs	  due	  to	  transaction	  costs,	  while	  
the	  size	  of	  the	  parameter	  θ	  depends	  on	  the	  demand	  elasticity	  for	  the	  banking	  product6.	   In	  
the	  case	  of	  deposits,	  MC	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  (Sander	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  If	  banks	  
were	  operating	  effectively	  in	  a	  perfectly	  competitive	  world,	  moves	  in	  MC	  would	  be	  entirely	  
reflected	  in	  BR:	  the	  coefficient	  θ	  would	  be	  equal	  to	  one.	  Such	  an	  approach	  is	  widely	  used	  in	  
the	  literature,	  for	  example	  in	  De	  Bond	  (2002),	  Sander	  et	  al.	  (2004),	  De	  Graeve	  et	  al.	  (2007),	  
ECB	  (2009),	  Rocha	  (2012),	  Van	  Leuvensteijn	  et	  al.	   (2013),	  Daracq	  Paries	  et	  al.	   (2014),	  Leroy	  
and	  Lucotte	  (2015)	  among	  others.	  We	  do	  not	  call	  into	  question	  this	  approach,	  but	  the	  way	  it	  
is	  empirically	  implemented.	  
For	   deposit	   rates,	   the	  marginal	   cost	   price	   considered	   usually	   corresponds	   to	   the	   price	   of	  
unsecured	  funding.	  This	  approach	  is	   justified	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  banks	  traditionally	  price	  their	  
retail	   products	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  marginal	   cost	   of	   unsecured	   funding	   (Cadamagnani	  et	   al.,	  
2015).	  This	  cost	  is	  usually	  approximated	  by	  a	  market	  interest	  rate	  for	  unsecured	  funding,	  the	  
EURIBOR	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Eurozone.	  As	   it	  appears	   in	  De	  Bond	  (2002)	  e.g.,	   the	  underlying	  
idea	   behind	   this	  widely	   spread	   custom	   is	   that	  market	   interest	   rates	   are	   seen	   as	   the	  most	  
appropriate	  marginal	  cost	  prices	  due	  to	  their	  “accurate	  reflection	  of	  the	  marginal	  costs	  faced	  
by	  banks”.	  Consistently,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  empirical	  studies	  analyzing	  the	  pricing	  of	  banks’	  
retail	  products	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  use	  EURIBOR	  rates	  as	  benchmarks7.	  We	  are	  arguing	  that	  this	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  In	  the	  case	  of	  deposits,	  switching	  costs,	  information	  asymmetries	  and	  market	  power	  will	  for	  example	  generally	  imply	  θ<1.	  
Hutcheson	  (1995)	  provides	  solid	  theoretical	  foundations	  on	  this	  point.	  
7	   See	   for	   example	   Sander	  et	   al.	   (2004),	   De	  Graeve	  et	   al.	   (2007),	   ECB	   (2009),	   ECB	   (2012a),	   Rocha	   (2012),	   Banerjee	  et	   al.	  
(2013),	  Van	  Leuvensteijn	  et	  al.	  (2013),	  Daracq	  Paries	  et	  al.	  (2014),	  Leroy	  and	  Lucotte	  (2015)	  among	  others.	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2.2 The	  irrelevance	  of	  the	  EURIBOR	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  world	  
	  
The	  EURIBOR	  is	  computed	  based	  on	  a	  survey	  in	  which	  some	  representative	  banks	  (by	  their	  
activity	  on	  the	  euro	  money	  market)	  say	  how	  much	  they	  would	  charge	  a	  prime	  bank	  for	  an	  
unsecured	  loan	  on	  the	  money	  market	  (Taboga,	  2014).	  Prime	  banks	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  the	  
less	   fragile	   banks,	  what	  makes	   the	   EURIBOR	   sometimes	   called	   the	   “best	   rate	   for	   the	   best	  
banks”8.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  loans	  with	  no	  guarantee	  are	  considered,	  the	  EURIBOR	  is	  widely	  
used	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding	  in	  economic	  studies9.	  	  
The	  problems	  of	  using	  the	  EURIBOR	  as	  a	  benchmark	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding	  have	  
been	  revealed	  by	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis.	  A	  dramatic	  change	  that	  occurred	  is	  that	  funding	  
conditions	   have	   become	   extremely	   heterogeneous	   (ECB,	   2012b).	   As	   a	   consequence,	   the	  
EURIBOR	   has	   become	   by	   essence	   non-­‐representative	   of	   the	   funding	   conditions	   for	   the	  
majority	   of	   the	   banks,	   especially	   for	   the	   banks	   located	   in	   the	   periphery	   of	   the	   Eurozone,	  
which	  have	  been	  perceived	  as	  much	  more	  risky.	  Figure	  3	  illustrates	  this	  fact	  by	  showing	  the	  
average	  CDS	  of	  the	  10	  banks	  with	  respectively	  the	  lowest	  and	  highest	  CDS	  in	  our	  sample.	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  Top	  10	  versus	  Bottom	  10	  Eurozone	  banks	  CDS
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Markit,	  authors’	  sample.	  CDS	  are	  in	  percentage	  points.	  
	  
As	  funding	  conditions	  became	  extremely	  heterogeneous	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  non-­‐prime	  banks	  
could	  borrow	  became	  heterogeneously	  disconnected	   from	  the	   rates	  at	  which	  prime	  banks	  
can	  borrow.	  Under	   these	   conditions,	   econometric	  or	   graphical	   analysis	  using	   the	  EURIBOR	  
will	   automatically	   fail	   to	   capture	  any	  meaningful	   long-­‐term	   relationship	  with	  deposit	   rates	  
for	  non-­‐prime	  banks10.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  See	  Taboga	  (2014)	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  EURIBOR.	  
9	  It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  the	  EURIBOR	  can	  be	  an	  appropriate	  benchmark	  for	  banks	  others	  than	  “prime	  banks”	  also	  when	  
the	   risk	   premium	   the	   later	  would	   pay	  when	   borrowing	   unsecured	   (compared	  with	   prime	   banks)	   is	   negligible	   or	   roughly	  
constant	  over	  time.	  This	  can	  explain	  why	  the	  use	  of	  the	  EURIBOR	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding	  in	  pre-­‐crisis	  
economic	  studies	  used	  to	  be	  not	  problematic.	  
10	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  heterogeneity	  in	  funding	  conditions,	  two	  other	  observations	  may	  contribute	  to	  make	  the	  EURIBOR	  less	  
relevant:	  the	  number	  of	  “prime	  banks”	  has	  severely	  declined	  (Taboga,	  2014)	  and	  the	  liquidity	  on	  the	  unsecured	  interbank	  
market	  has	   severely	  decreased	   since	   the	   financial	   crisis	   (Babihuga	  and	  Spaltro,	   2014;	   Financial	   Times,	   2010).	   The	   former	  
argument	   implies	  that	  the	  EURIBOR	  has	  become	  of	  direct	  relevance	  for	  only	   few	  banks	   in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  world.	  The	   later	  






Lower 10 Banks 1-Year CDS Higer 10 Banks 1-Year CDS
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2.3 A	  new	  proxy	  for	  banks’	  unsecured	  funding	  costs	  
	  
We	  build	  a	  new	  index	  for	  banks’	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding	  at	  the	  country-­‐level11.	  Similar	  to	  
Illes	  et	  al.	  (2015),	  we	  use	  the	  standard	  structure	  of	  interest	  rates	  to	  proxy	  the	  interest	  rate	  
on	  unsecured	  debt	  for	  bank	  n	  at	  time	  t:	  	  
	  
Interest	  rate	  n,t	  =	  risk-­‐free	  rate	  n,t	  +	  risk	  premium	  n,t	  +	  liquidity	  premium	  n,t	  
	  
The	   risk-­‐free	   rate	   is	   proxied	  by	   the	  Overnight	   Index	   Swap	   rate	   (OIS	   rate	  henceforth)	   for	   a	  
given	  maturity,	  which	  is	  supposed	  to	  reflect	  only	  the	  policy	  interest	  rate	  expectations12.	  The	  
risk	   premium	   is	   proxied	   by	   the	   Credit	   Default	   Swap	   (CDS	   henceforth)	   of	   the	   bank	   n	   in	  
percentage	  points	  for	  comparable	  maturities13.	  Thus	  our	  index	  for	  the	  real	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  
funding	  for	  bank	  n	  at	  time	  t	  is	  simply:	  
	   𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝑜𝑓  𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  !,! = 𝑂𝐼𝑆! + 𝐶𝐷𝑆!,!	  
	  
With	  𝑂𝐼𝑆!	  the	  OIS	  rate	  at	  time	  t	  for	  the	  maturity	  considered	  and	  𝐶𝐷𝑆!,!	  the	  CDS	  of	  the	  bank	  
for	  comparable	  maturities	   in	  percentage	  points.	  Using	  a	  weighted	  average	  of	  this	   indicator	  
for	   all	   the	   banks	   in	   the	   country	   i	   we	   obtain	   an	   index	   at	   the	   country	   level	   for	   the	   cost	   of	  
unsecured	  funding:	  	  
	   𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥  !,! = 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!,! ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝑜𝑓  𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  !,!!!!! 	  
	  
Where	  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!,!	   is	   the	  customer	  deposits	  of	   the	  bank	  n	   in	  proportion	  of	   the	   total	  
deposits	  of	  the	  banks	  in	  country	  i	  (weighting	  criteria)14.	  	  
In	  contrast	  with	  the	  EURIBOR,	  our	  index	  thus	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  heterogeneity	  in	  funding	  
conditions	  between	  prime	  and	  non-­‐prime	  banks.	  A	  simple	  way	  to	  see	  this	  is	  that	  we	  will	  now	  




	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
EURIBOR	  is	  based	  on	  declarations	  rather	  than	  on	  actual	  rates,	  it	  may	  indeed	  have	  become	  disconnected	  from	  the	  rates	  at	  
which	  banks	  can	  effectively	  borrow	  on	  the	  unsecured	  market,	  for	  example	  by	  issuing	  debt.	  
11	  Building	  a	  proxy	  is	  necessary	  insofar	  as	  there	  are	  no	  monthly	  data	  available	  for	  bank-­‐specific	  unsecured	  debt	  with	  a	  given	  
maturity.	  
12	  See	  Taboga	  (2014)	  for	  a	  discussion.	  
13	  We	  do	  not	  explicitly	  take	  into	  account	  liquidity	  premia	  for	  two	  reasons:	  first	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  appropriate	  data,	  second	  
CDS	  already	  contain	  a	  liquidity	  premium	  that	  might	  thus	  make	  up	  for	  this	  omission.	  
14	  We	  also	  considered	  weighting	  CDS	  by	  banks’	  total	  assets:	  the	  indicator	  obtained	  by	  doing	  so	  was	  very	  similar,	  so	  that	  the	  
results	  presented	  here	  were	  roughly	  unchanged.	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We	   consider	   the	   standard	   framework	   in	   which	   deposit	   rates	   are	   linked	   to	   the	   cost	   of	  
unsecured	   funding,	  discussed	   in	   subsection	  2.115.	  We	  consider	   the	  usual	   specification	  with	  
EURIBOR	  (1)	  and	  the	  specification	  with	  our	  index	  (2).	  	  
	   𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!,! = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡! +   𝛽  𝐸𝑈𝑅𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅!,! + 𝜀!,!	  	  	  (1)	  
	   𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!,! = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡! +   𝛽  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥  !,! + 𝜀!,!	  	  (2)	  
	  
The	   deposit	   pricing	   behavior	   of	   banks	   should	   imply	   a	   linear	   relationship	   between	   deposit	  
rates	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  No	  other	  variable	  is	  needed	  if	  this	  
long-­‐term	  relationship	  holds	  in	  theory16.	  In	  econometrics	  terms,	  considering	  the	  variables	  as	  
integrated	   of	   order	   1,	   this	  means	   that	   the	   two	   variables	   should	   be	   cointegrated.	   In	  what	  
follows	  we	  perform	  cointegration	  tests	  with,	  in	  turn,	  EURIBOR	  and	  our	  index	  used	  as	  a	  proxy,	  





Our	  dataset	  consists	  of	  monthly	  data	  from	  2003:1	  to	  2015:1.	  	  
We	   use	   country-­‐level	   deposit	   rates	   from	   ECB.	   In	   order	   to	   precisely	   capture	   the	   pricing	  
behavior	  of	  banks,	  we	  use	  deposit	   rates	  with	  an	  agreed	  maturity	  a)	  with	  a	  maturity	   lower	  
than	  1	  year	  b)	  with	  a	  maturity	  between	  1	  and	  2	  years	  and	  c)	  with	  a	  maturity	  over	  2	  years.	  
Deposits	  from	  households	  and	  non-­‐profit	   institutions	  are	  considered	  in	  that	  they	  represent	  
the	  most	  important	  share	  of	  deposits	  and	  the	  one	  appearing	  as	  highly	  remunerated	  (Figure	  
1).	  
We	  obtain	   banks’	   CDS	   from	  Markit	   and	   restrict	   our	   sample	   to	   retail	   banks.	  We	   select	   the	  
countries	  based	  on	  data	  availability	   for	  bank	  CDS17:	  Austria,	  Germany,	   France,	   Italy,	   Spain,	  
Netherlands.	  One-­‐year	  CDS	  contracts	  on	  senior	  unsecured	  debt	  are	  considered	   in	  order	   to	  
closely	  match	  deposits’	  maturity.	  Banks’	  total	  customer	  deposits	  data	  used	  for	  weighting	  are	  
from	  Bankscope	  and	   linearly	   interpolated.	  OIS	  rates	  for	  a	  maturity	  of	  3	  months	  and	  1	  year	  
are	  considered.	  	  
Standard	  panel	  unit-­‐root	  tests	  confirm	  that	  all	  our	  data	  are	  integrated	  of	  order	  1	  (Appendix	  
3),	  thus	  making	  a	  cointegration	  analysis	  appropriate.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	   Note	   that	   we	   do	   not	   question	   this	   aspect	   of	   the	   literature	   in	   this	   paper.	   The	   pricing	   of	   deposits	   using	   the	   cost	   of	  
unsecured	  funding	  as	  a	  benchmark	  is	  often	  presented	  as	  a	  traditional	  feature	  of	  banks’	  pricing	  behavior	  (see	  Cadamagnani	  
et	  al.	  2015	  eg)	  and	  widely	  spread	  in	  the	  empirical	  literature.	  We	  focus	  on	  improving	  this	  strand	  of	  the	  literature.	  
16	  Competition	  in	  the	  banking	  sector	  is	  neglected	  as	  we	  have	  a	  short	  period	  (7	  years,	  see	  subsection	  3.2)	  in	  which	  this	  factor	  
is	  likely	  not	  to	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  and	  is	  possibly	  taken	  into	  account	  through	  the	  constant	  term.	  
17	  In	  order	  to	  get	  a	  representative	  proxy	  a	  country	  is	  selected	  if	  we	  have	  data	  for	  at	  least	  four	  major	  banks	  (see	  Appendix	  2).	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4.	  Cointegration	  tests:	  EURIBOR	  versus	  our	  index	  
	  
	  
4.1	  Panel	  analysis	  
	  
We	   first	  make	   cointegration	   tests	   in	   a	   panel	   framework,	  where	  we	  naturally	   expect	  more	  
power	  from	  the	  tests	  given	  the	  potential	  correlation	  of	  shocks	  hitting	  eurozone	  economies.	  
Following	  the	  connected	  literature	  (Rocha,	  2012;	  Bernhofer	  and	  Van	  Treeck,	  2013;	  Leroy	  and	  
Lucotte,	   2014	   ;	   Illes	   et	   al.,	   2015)	   and	   given	   our	   small	   N	   dimension,	   we	   primarily	   use	   the	  
Westerlund	   tests	   (Westerlund,	   2007)	   for	   cointegration	   (see	  Appendix	   3).	  We	   focus	  on	   the	  
post	   crisis	   period,	  where	   the	   puzzle	   appears	   (results	   for	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   period	   are	   given	   in	  
Appendix	  4	  and	  indicate	  cointegration	  with	  both	  the	  EURIBOR	  and	  our	  index).	  In	  order	  not	  to	  
take	   into	  account	   the	  huge	  volatility	   following	  Lehman	  brother’s	  bankruptcy	  at	   the	  end	  of	  
2008,	  we	  start	  our	  analysis	  in	  2009:1.	  Table	  1	  reports	  the	  results,	  where	  in	  the	  first	  column	  
we	  stick	  to	  the	  basic	  approach	  of	  Westerlund	  (2007)	  and	  in	  the	  second	  column	  we	  account	  
for	   cross-­‐sectionnal	   dependence	   using	   the	   bootstrap	   approach	   of	  Westerlund	   (2007)	  with	  
800	  replications	  (maximum	  allowed	  in	  our	  software).	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Westerlunds	  tests	  for	  cointegration	  (2009:1	  –	  2015:1)	  
	   Westerlunds	  tests	  of	  cointegration	  
Basic	   Robust	   to	   cross-­‐sectional	  
dependence	  



















<	  1	  year	  
0.729	   0.248	   0.675	   0.420	   0.641	   0.309	   0.721	   0.542	  
Deposit	  
between	  
1	   and	   2	  
years	  
0.076	   0.001	   0.441	   0.125	   0.135	   0.048	   0.596	   0.416	  
Deposit	  	  
>	  2	  years	  




<	  1	  year	  
0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	  
Deposit	  
between	  
1	   and	   2	  
years	  
0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.001	   0.006	   0.003	   0.003	  
Deposit	  	  
>	  2	  years	  
0.002	   0.011	   0.000	   0.000	   0.034	   0.037	   0.054	   0.031	  
Note:	  The	  Ga	  and	  Gt	  test	  statistics	  test	  H0:	  ai	  =	  0	  for	  all	  i	  versus	  H1:	  ai	  <	  0	  for	  at	  least	  one	  i,	  where	  ai	  is	  the	  error	  correction	  
coefficient	   (see	  Westerlund	   (2007)	   and	   Appendix	   3).	   These	   statistics	   start	   from	   a	   weighted	   average	   of	   the	   individually	  
estimated	  ai's	  and	  their	  t-­‐ratio's	  respectively.	  Rejection	  of	  H0	  should	  be	  taken	  as	  evidence	  of	  cointegration	  of	  at	  least	  one	  of	  
the	  cross-­‐sectional	  units.	  The	  Pa	  and	  Pt	  test	  statistics	  pool	  information	  over	  all	  the	  cross-­‐sectional	  units	  to	  test	  H0:	  ai	  =	  0	  for	  
all	   i	   vs	   H1:	   	   ai	   <	   0	   for	   all	   i.	  We	   use	   an	   automatic	   selection	   of	   lags	   from	   the	   AIC	   criteria.	  We	   impose	   a	   constant	   in	   the	  
cointegration	   relationship	   as	   suggested	   by	   the	   theory.	   Following	   the	   literature,	   EURIBOR	   3months	   is	   used	   for	   the	  
cointegration	  relationship	  with	  deposits	  with	  a	  maturity	  lower	  1	  year	  (Deposit	  rates	  <	  1	  year),	  EURIBOR	  1	  year	  otherwise.	  
Similarly,	  OIS	  3	  months	  is	  used	  in	  our	  index	  for	  deposits	  with	  a	  maturity	  lower	  than	  1	  year,	  OIS	  1	  year	  otherwise.	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All	   in	   all,	   the	   results	   indicate	   that	   there	   is	   no	   cointegration	   relationship	   between	   deposit	  
rates	  and	  the	  EURIBOR	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  world,	  unlike	  what	  could	  be	  found	  in	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  
period	  (see	  Appendix	  4).	  	  
Only	  for	  deposits	  with	  a	  maturity	  from	  1	  to	  2	  years	  the	  Gt	  statistic	  suggests	  the	  presence	  of	  
cointegration	  for	  at	  least	  one	  panel,	  but	  the	  result	  barely	  holds	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  robust	  
version	   of	   the	  Westerlund	   test.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   cointegration	   relationship	   can	   be	   inferred	  
with	  our	  index,	  and	  this	  for	  all	  the	  deposit	  maturities	  considered	  here.	  	  
In	   Appendix	   4,	   we	   show	   that	   the	   conclusions	   are	   roughly	   similar	   when	   we	   consider	   an	  
alternative	  (residual-­‐based)	  cointegration	  test,	  namely	  the	  Pedroni	  test,	  although	  the	  test	  is	  
less	  adapted	  to	  our	  small	  N	  case.	  
	  
	  
4.2 Country-­‐level	  analysis	  
	  
To	  better	  understand	  what	  drives	  these	  findings,	  we	  run	  cointegration	  tests	  at	  the	  country-­‐
level.	  We	  apply	   the	  Engle	  and	  Granger	  method.	  That	   is	  we	  estimate	  equations	   (1)	   and	   (2)	  
directly	  and	  test	  for	  stationarity	  of	  the	  estimated	  residuals	  by	  estimating	  the	  following	  model	  
in	  each	  country:	  	  
	   ∆𝜀! = α𝜀!!! + 𝑢!	  	  (3)	  
	  
And	   testing	   for	   H0:	  α = 0	   (unit	   root)	   vs	   H1:	   α   ≠ 0	   (no	   unit	   root)	   using	   the	   interpolated	  
Dickey-­‐Fuller	  critical	  values	  as	  a	   reference18.	  Note	  that	  we	   include	   lags	  of	   the	   independent	  
variable,	  with	  a	  selection	  based	  on	  the	  AIC	  criteria19.	  Results	  are	  given	  for	  the	  5%	  threshold,	  
we	   indicate	   in	   Table	   3	   directly	   whether	   H0	   is	   rejected	   or	   not	   since	   the	   software	   we	   use	  
(STATA)	  doesn’t	  report	  the	  p-­‐values.	  	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  We	  didn’t	  include	  any	  constant	  or	  trend	  in	  (3)	  thus	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  use	  the	  McKinnon	  critical	  values.	  
19	  With	  a	  maximum	  of	  4	   lags	  and	  a	  minimum	  of	  2	   lags	   in	  order	   to	  avoid	  any	  biais	   affecting	   the	   test	   (setting	  a	  minimum	  
doesn’t	  impact	  our	  results).	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Table	  2:	  Test	  for	  cointegration	  in	  subsamples	  (2009:1	  –	  2015:1)	  
	   	   	  
Do	  the	  estimated	  residuals	  of	  equation	  (1)	  or	  (2)	  contain	  a	  unit	  root	  
(test	  at	  the	  5%	  threshold)?	  
	  




<	  1	  year	  
No	   Yes	  *	   No	   Yes*	   No	   Yes*	  
Deposit	  	  
between	  
1	   and	   2	  
years	  
No	   Yes	  *	   No	   Yes	  *	   No	   No	  
Deposit	  	  
>	  2	  years	  
No	   No	   Yes	  *	   Yes	  *	   No	   Yes	  *	  
With	   our	  
Index	  
Deposit	  	  
<	  1	  year	  
No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	  
Deposit	  	  
between	  
1	   and	   2	  
years	  
No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	  
Deposit	  	  
>	  2	  years	  
No	   No	   No	   No	   No	   No	  
Note:	  (*)	  when	  the	  Dickey-­‐fuller	  test	  rejects	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  unit	  root	  at	  the	  5%	  threshold,	  we	  consider	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
unit	  root	  “no”.	  Otherwise	  we	  note	  “yes”,	  which	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  “we	  have	  no	  proof	  that	  there	  is	  no	  unit	  root”.	  We	  
interpret	   “rejecting	  unit	   root”	  as	  evidence	  of	   cointegration.	  We	  use	  an	  automatic	   selection	  of	   lags	   from	   the	  AIC	   criteria.	  
Following	  the	  literature,	  EURIBOR	  3	  months	  is	  used	  for	  the	  cointegration	  relationship	  with	  deposits	  with	  a	  maturity	  lower	  
than	  1	  year,	  EURIBOR	  1	  year	  otherwise.	  Similarly,	  OIS	  3	  months	  is	  used	  in	  our	  index	  for	  deposits	  with	  a	  maturity	  lower	  than	  
1	  year,	  OIS	  1	  year	  otherwise.	  
	  
As	  we	   can	   see	  on	   Table	   2,	   the	   data	   do	  not	   give	   support	   to	   any	   cointegration	   relationship	  
between	   EURIBOR	   and	   the	   deposit	   rates	   for	   France,	   Italy	   and	   Spain.	   In	   contrast,	   the	  
cointegration	   relationship	   is	   always	   captured	   by	   our	   index.	   Interestingly,	   the	   relationship	  
fails	  with	  the	  EURIBOR	  in	  countries	  in	  which	  banks	  have	  become	  perceived	  as	  riskier.	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5.	  Graphical	  analysis:	  EURIBOR	  versus	  our	  Index	  
	  
	  
5.1	  Basic	  observation	  
	  
When	   using	   our	   index	   the	   picture	   regarding	   deposit	   remuneration	   changes	   dramatically,	  
especially	  for	  periphery-­‐countries	  (Figure	  5).	  	  
Deposits	   do	  not	   appear	   anymore	   as	   significantly	   over-­‐remunerated	   since	   the	  beginning	  of	  
the	  financial	  crisis20	  (Figure	  4	  and	  5).	  Only	  after	  2013	  some	  persistent	  “over-­‐remuneration”	  
appears,	   although	   often	   limited.	   This	   trend	   is	   present	   in	   all	   the	   six	   countries	  we	   analyzed	  
(Figure	   9,	   Appendix	   1)	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   Netherlands.	   This	   indicates	   that	   other	  
factors	  that	  were	  not	  present	  before	  2013	  are	  at	  work	  since	  then.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4:	  EURIBOR,	  Authors’	  index	  and	  Deposit	  rates	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  
	  
Source:	  Authors’	  sample,	  ECB	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  fact	  we	  used	  1	  year	  CDS	  premia	  rather	  than	  the	  ones	  of	  a	  shorter	  maturity	  could	  partly	  explain	  
the	  lower	  gap	  with	  our	  proxy.	  We	  take	  this	  into	  account	  hereafter	  by	  basing	  our	  comparisons	  on	  predicted	  rates	  from	  two	  
different	  models:	  the	  results	  clearly	  indicate	  that	  this	  choice	  doesn’t	  have	  any	  key	  impact	  on	  our	  conclusions.	  Note	  also	  that	  
the	  picture	   is	  barely	  different	  when	  we	  use	  CDS	  6	  months	   (available	   for	   fewer	  data)	   instead	  of	  1	  year,	  with	  sometimes	  a	  
proxy	  showing	  even	  higher	  rates	  than	  when	  we	  use	  CDS	  1	  year	  (what	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  the	  short	  term	  risk	  is	  
sometimes	  perceived	  as	  higher	   than	  the	   long	   term	  one).	   In	  our	  sample	   the	  difference	  between	  the	   index	  we	  could	  build	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Households Deposits up to one year
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Figure	  5:	  EURIBOR,	  Authors’	  index	  and	  Deposit	  rates	  in	  the	  Eurozone:	  
Core	  versus	  Periphery	  countries	  
	  




5.2	  Observation	  based	  on	  predicted	  rates	  
	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  quantify	  to	  which	  extent	  the	  misuse	  of	  the	  EURIBOR	  contributes	  to	  make	  deposit	  
rates	  appear	  over-­‐remunerated,	  we	  look	  at	  the	  level	  of	  deposit	  rates	  which	  is	  predicted	  by	  a	  
simple	  model	  using	   the	  EURIBOR	  as	  a	  key	  variable,	  and	   then	  compare	   this	  prediction	  with	  
the	   one	   from	   a	   similar	   model	   using	   our	   index	   as	   a	   key	   variable.	   The	   model	   used	   is	   the	  
standard	  Panel	  Mean-­‐Group	  model	  (Pesaran	  and	  Smith,	  1995).	  We	  estimate	  the	  parameters	  
of	  the	  models	  for	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period,	  and	  then	  use	  them	  to	  predict	  deposit	  rates	  (details	  of	  
the	  estimates	  are	  given	  in	  Appendix	  5).	  	  
As	  we	  can	  see	  on	  Figure	  6,	  using	  the	  EURIBOR	  leads	  us	  to	  predict	  significantly	  lower	  deposit	  
rates	   than	  when	  we	  use	  our	   index	   (Figure	  10	  and	  11	   in	  Appendix	  1	   shows	   the	  picture	   for	  
each	  country).	  A	  simple	  computation	  shows	  that	  72%	  of	  the	  seemingly	  over-­‐remuneration	  of	  












Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.53
	   13	  
Figure	  6:	  Predicted	  deposit	  rates	  with	  the	  EURIBOR	  and	  with	  authors’	  index	  
versus	  actual	  deposit	  rates	  in	  the	  Eurozone:	  
	  
	  






This	  study	  shows	  that	  the	  EURIBOR	  has	  become	  an	  inappropriate	  benchmark	  to	  analyze	  the	  
pricing	  of	  deposit	  rates	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  period	  in	  the	  Eurozone.	  We	  argued	  that	  the	  reason	  
for	   this	   is	   that	   the	   EURIBOR	   doesn’t	   faithfully	   reflect	   the	   cost	   of	   unsecured	   funding	   for	  
Eurozone	  banks	  anymore,	  given	  the	  substantial	  heterogeneity	  in	  bank	  funding	  conditions.	  In	  
contrast,	   the	   index	   we	   have	   built	   appears	   more	   relevant.	   It	   captures	   the	   post-­‐crisis	  
heterogeneity	   in	   funding	   conditions	   and	   restores	   the	   cointegration	   relationship	   between	  
deposit	  rates	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  unsecured	  funding.	  	  
Our	   index	   shows	   that	   banks’	   deposits	   have	   actually	   not	   been	   significantly	   “over-­‐
remunerated”	   since	   the	   2008	   financial	   crisis.	   We	   find	   that	   72%	   of	   the	   seemingly	   over-­‐
remuneration	  of	  deposits	  is	  actually	  explained	  by	  the	  use	  of	  the	  wrong	  benchmark,	  namely	  
the	   EURIBOR.	   This	   observation	   both	   attenuates	   the	   veracity	   of	   the	   statements	   made	   in	  
previous	  works	  (ECB,	  2009;	  ECB,	  2012a;	  Daracq	  Paries	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  and	  lays	  the	  foundations	  
for	   future	   research:	   the	   behavior	   of	   deposit	   rates	   can’t	   be	   analyzed	   with	   the	   EURIBOR	  
anymore.	  
Further	   research	   remains	   necessary	   to	   understand	   which	   new	   factors	   have	   been	   driving	  
deposit	   rates	   in	   the	   recent	   years.	  Our	   analysis	   indeed	   reveals	   that	   new	   factors	   have	  been	  
influencing	   the	   pricing	   of	   deposit	   rates	   in	   Eurozone	   countries	   since	   2013.	   For	   such	  
subsequent	   research	   our	   paper	   shows	   the	   necessity	   of	   using	   alternative	   proxies	   to	   the	  
EURIBOR.	  We	  provide	  a	  simple	  and	  coherent	  one.	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Appendix	  
	  
Appendix	  1:	  Graph	  
	  
Figure	  7:	  Deposit	  rates	  (agreed	  maturity	  lower	  than	  1	  year)	  and	  the	  EURIBOR	  in	  the	  




Figure	  8:	  Deposit	  rates	  (agreed	  maturity	  between	  1	  and	  2	  years	  and	  over	  2	  years)	  and	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Figure	  9:	  EURIBOR,	  Authors’	  index	  and	  Deposit	  rates	  in	  the	  Eurozone,	  by	  countries	  
	  
Source:	  Authors’	  sample,	  ECB	  
	  
Figure	  10:	  Predicted	  deposit	  rates	  with	  the	  EURIBOR	  and	  with	  authors’	  index	  
versus	  actual	  deposit	  rates	  in	  the	  Eurozone,	  by	  countries:	  
	  
Source:	  Authors’	  estimates,	  ECB	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Figure	  11:	  Share	  of	  deposits	  over-­‐remuneration	  due	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  wrong	  proxy	  (deposits	  
with	  an	  agreed	  maturity	  lower	  that	  one	  year)	  
	  
Source:	  Authors’	  estimates,	  ECB	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Appendix	  2	  :	  Variables	  
	  
Sample	  of	  banks:	  
Country	   Banks	  
Austria	   BAWAG	  P.S.K.	  AG	  *	  
	   ERSTE	  GROUP	  BANK	  *	  
	   Raiffeisen	  Zentralbank	  Österreich	  AG	  *	  
	   UNICREDIT	  Bank	  of	  Austria	  AG	  *	  
France	   BNP	  PARIBAS	  *	  
	   Banque	  Fédérative	  du	  Crédit	  Mutuel	  *	  
	   Crédit	  Industriel	  et	  Commercial	  SA	  –	  CIC	  	  
	   Crédit	  Agricole	  SA	  *	  
	   Crédit	  Lyonnais	  	  
	   Société	  Générale	  *	  
Germany	   Bayerischen	  Hypo-­‐	  und	  Vereinsbank	  AG	  
	   Bayerische	  Landesbank	  Giroz	  	  
	   Commerzbank	  AG	  *	  
	   Deutsche	  Bank	  AG	  *	  
	   DZ	  Bank	  AG	  *	  
	   HSH	  Nordbank	  AG	  	  
	   Landesbank	  BADENWUERTTEMBERG	  
	   Landesbank	  Berlin	  AG	  
	   Landesbank	  Hessen	  Giro	  
	   Norddeutsche	  Landesbank-­‐Girozentrale	  
	   UNICREDIT	  Bank	  AG	  *	  
Italy	   BANCA	  Monte	  dei	  Paschi	  di	  Siena	  S.P.A.	  *	  
	   Banca	  Naz	  del	  Lavoro	  
	   Banca	  Popolare	  di	  Milano	  *	  
	   Banco	  Popolare	  -­‐	  Società	  Cooperativa-­‐Banco	  Popolare	  
	   INTESA	  Sanpaolo	  S.P.A.	  *	  
	   Mediobanca	  S.P.A.	  
	   UNICREDITO	  Italiano	  S.P.A.	  *	  
	   Unione	  di	  Banche	  Italiane	  Società	  
Netherlands	   Cooperatieve	  Centrale	  Raiffeisen-­‐B.A.	  -­‐	  Rabobank	  Nederland	  *	  
	   ING	  Bank	  N.V.	  *	  
	   SNS	  Bank	  N.V.	  *	  
	   THE	  RBS	  N.V.	  *	  
Spain	   Bankinter	  *	  
	   Banco	  Bilbao	  Vizcaya	  Argentaria	  BBVA	  *	  
	   Banco	  de	  Sabadell	  S.A.	  
	   Banco	  Popular	  Espanol	  S.A.	  *	  
	   Banco	  Santander	  S.A.	  *	  
	   Caixa	  d'Estalvis	  i	  Pensions	  de	  Barcelona	  
*	  means	  that	  the	  bank	  is	  among	  the	  top	  5	  commercial	  banks	  (by	  assets)	  found	  in	  Bankscope	  in	  2014	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Label	   Source	  
Bank	  CDS	   CDS	   1	   year	   on	   Senior	   Debt	  
Mid	  rate	  	  
	  
Markit	  
Bank	  total	  assets	   -­‐	   Bankscope.	  	  
Monthly	   values	   linearly	  
interpolated	  before	  2014.	  
After	   2014,	   value	   of	  
December	   2014	   (since	   no	  
data)	  
Bank	  total	  customers	  deposits	   -­‐	   Bankscope.	  	  
Monthly	   values	   linearly	  
interpolated	  before	  2014.	  
After	   2014,	   value	   of	  
December	   2014	   (since	   no	  
data)	  
Deposit	  rates	   Deposit	   with	   agreed	  
maturity.	  Respectively	  up	  to	  
one	   year,	   between	   1	   and	   2	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Appendix	  3:	  Details	  on	  the	  empirical	  approach	  
Results	  of	  the	  unit	  root	  tests	  
To	  study	  the	  order	  of	  integration	  of	  our	  variables,	  we	  use	  the	  standard	  panel	  unit-­‐root	  tests	  
used	  in	  the	  literature	  we	  are	  in	  line	  with	  (Rocha,	  2012;	  Van	  Leuvensteijn	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Leroy	  
and	   Lucotte,	   2014),	   namely	   the	   Im-­‐Pesaran-­‐Shin	   test	   and	   the	   Hadri	   test.	   These	   tests	   are	  
suitable	  for	  our	  small	  N	  dimension	  and	  accounts	  for	  potential	  heterogeneity,	  while	  allowing	  
us	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   our	   panel	   dimension.	   We	   use	   the	   whole	   sample	   period	   when	  
possible	  (2003:1	  –	  2015:1).	  We	  do	  not	  include	  a	  time	  trend	  in	  the	  tests	  since	  it	  is	  clear	  there	  
is	   no	   such	   trend	   in	   the	   data,	   and	   select	   the	   number	   of	   lags	   with	   the	   AIC	   criteria	   (with	   a	  
maximum	  of	  5).	  The	  Im-­‐Pesaran-­‐Shin	  test	  has	  as	  a	  nul	  hypothesis	  (H0)	  that	  all	  the	  series	  have	  
a	  unit	   root	   (versus	  H1:	   at	   least	  one	   serie	  has	   a	  unit	   root).	   Table	  A1	   shows	   that	   for	   all	   the	  
series	  we	  deal	  with,	  H0	  cannot	  be	  rejected	  at	  the	  conventional	  thresholds	   level	  of	  5%.	  The	  
Hadri	  test	  has	  as	  a	  nul	  hypothesis	  that	  all	  the	  series	  are	  stationary	  (versus	  H1:	  at	   least	  one	  
serie	  has	  a	  unit	  root).	  As	  we	  can	  see	  on	  Table	  A1,	  H0	  is	  clearly	  rejected	  for	  all	  the	  series	  we	  
deal	  with.	  Doing	  the	  tests	  for	  the	  first	  difference	  leads	  us	  to	  reject	  the	  unit	  root	  hypothesis	  
(or	  for	  the	  Hadri	  test	  not	  to	  reject	  the	  stationarity	  hypothesis)	  so	  that	  we	  infer	  the	  variables	  
are	   I	   (1).	   For	   the	   EURIBOR,	   the	   standard	   Augmented	   Dickey-­‐Fuller	   test	   is	   used,	   and	   also	  
shows	  the	  series	  are	  I(1).	  
	  
Table	  A1:	  Stationarity	  tests	  
	   lm-­‐Pesaran	   and	   Shin	  
test:	  p-­‐value	  
Hadri	  test:	  p-­‐value	   Augmented	   Dickey-­‐
Fuller	   test,	   HO	  
rejected	   at	   5%	  
threshold?	  
	   Level	   First	  
Difference	  
Level	   First	  
Difference	  
Level	   First	  
Difference	  
Deposits	   up	   to	   one	  
year	  
0.29	   0.00	   0.00	   0.06	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Deposits	   between	   1	  
and	  2	  years	  
0.35	   0.00	   0.00	   0.29	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Deposits	  over	  2	  years	   0.43	   0.00	   0.00	   0.95	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
EURIBOR	  3	  months	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   No	   Yes	  
EURIBOR	  1	  year	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   No	   Yes	  
Authors’	   Index	   built	  
with	  OIS	  3	  months	  
0.56	   0.00	   0.00	   0.13	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Authors’	   Index	   built	  
with	  OIS	  1	  year	  
0.79	   0.00	   0.00	   0.22	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Notes:	   Im-­‐Pesaran-­‐Shin	  test	  has	  as	  a	  null	  hypothesis	  “all	  the	  series	  have	  a	  unit	  root”	  versus	  H1	  “at	   least	  one	  serie	  has	  no	  
unit	  root”.	  Not	  rejecting	  is	  interpreted	  as	  no	  prove	  of	  stationarity.	  The	  Hadri	  test	  has	  as	  a	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  “all	  the	  series	  
are	   stationary”	   versus	   H1	   “at	   least	   one	   serie	   has	   a	   unit	   root”.	   All	   tests	   are	   performed	  without	   any	   trend	   included.	   The	  
augmented	  ADF	  test	  has	  as	  a	  null	  hypothesis	  “the	  serie	  has	  a	  unit	  root”,	  not	  rejecting	  leads	  us	  to	  infer	  non-­‐stationarity.	  It	  is	  
performed	  for	  EURIBOR	  in	  so	  far	  as	  this	  serie	  is	  the	  same	  for	  each	  country.	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Information	  on	  the	  cointegration	  tests	  used	  
	  
-­‐	  Westerlund	  test	  	  
The	  Westerlund	  test	  is	  part	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “regression	  based”	  tests.	  The	  underlying	  idea	  is	  
to	   test	   for	   the	   absence	   of	   cointegration	   by	   determining	   whether	   there	   exists	   an	   error	  
correction	  mechanism	  for	   individual	  panel	  members	  or	  for	  the	  panel	  as	  a	  whole.	   	  Consider	  
the	   following	   Error	   Correction	   Model	   (ECM	   henceforth),	   where	   all	   variables	   in	   levels	   are	  
assumed	  to	  be	  I(1):	  
	   ∆𝑦!,! = 𝑐! + 𝑎! 𝑦!,! − 𝛽!𝑥!,! + 𝛼!,!∆𝑦!,!!!!!!! + 𝛾!,!∆𝑥!,!!!!!!! + 𝑢!,!	  (4)	  
	  𝑎! 	  provides	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  speed	  of	  error-­‐correction	  towards	  the	  long	  run	  equilibrium	  for	  
that	   series	   i.	   The	   𝛼!,! 	   and	   𝛾!,! 	   coefficients	   take	   into	   account	   the	   short	   term	   adjustments	  
between	  the	  variables.	  From	  this	  equation,	  Westerlund	  (2007)	  computes	  four	  statistics.	  The	  
Ga	  and	  Gt	   test	   statistics	   test	  H0:	  𝑎! 	  =	  0	   for	  all	   i	   versus	  H1:	  𝑎! 	  <	  0	   for	  at	   least	  one	   i.	  These	  
statistics	  are	  built	  from	  a	  weighted	  average	  of	  the	  individualy	  estimated	  𝑎! 	  and	  their	  t-­‐ratio's	  
respectively.	  Rejection	  of	  H0	   should	   therefore	  be	   taken	  as	  evidence	  of	   cointegration	  of	   at	  
least	  one	  of	  the	  cross-­‐sectional	  units.	  The	  Pa	  and	  Pt	  test	  statistics	  pool	  information	  over	  all	  
the	   cross-­‐sectional	  units	   to	   test	  H0:	  𝑎! 	   =	  0	   for	  all	   i	   vs	  H1:	   	  𝑎! 	   <	  0	   for	  all	   i.	  Rejection	  of	  H0	  
should	  therefore	  be	  taken	  as	  evidence	  of	  cointegration	  for	  the	  panel	  as	  a	  whole.	  
The	  main	  advantages	  of	   these	   tests	  are	   that	   they	  are	  very	   flexible	   (one	  can	  decide	  on	   the	  
number	   of	   lags	   J	   and	   K	   to	   include)	   and	   that	   they	   allow	   for	   an	   almost	   completely	  
heterogeneous	  specification	  of	  both	  the	  long-­‐	  and	  short-­‐run	  parts	  of	  the	  ECM.	  This	  is	  a	  major	  
advantage	  as	  compared	  with	  the	  alternative	  Pedroni	  test	  (see	  here	  below).	  Westerlund	  also	  
provides	  a	   robust	  version	  of	   these	   tests	  which	   takes	   into	  account	  potential	   cross-­‐sectional	  
dependence.	  In	  this	  case,	  robust	  critical	  values	  can	  be	  obtained	  through	  bootstrapping	  (see	  
Westerlund	  (2007)).	  	  
In	  our	  estimates,	  similar	  to	  Sander	  and	  Kleimeier	  (2004)	  we	  allow	  for	  a	  maximum	  of	  4	   lags	  
for	   the	   differenced	   variables	   and	   then	   based	   the	   selection	   of	   lags	   on	   the	  AIC	   criteria.	  We	  
naturally	  include	  a	  constant	  as	  our	  model	  imposes	  for	  the	  ECM.	  Robust	  critical	  values	  were	  
obtained	  considering	  800	  replications	  for	  the	  bootstrapping.	  
	  
-­‐	  Pedroni	  test	  
Pedroni	   (1999,	   2004)	   introduced	   seven	   test	   statistics	   that	   are	   computed	   from	   the	   basic	  
regressions	   of	   one	   of	   the	   pre-­‐supposed	   cointegrated	   variable	   on	   the	   other,	   similar	   to	   the	  
Engle	  and	  Granger	  methodology	  in	  essence	  but	  in	  a	  panel	  framework	  here.	  	  
The	   test	   has	   the	   advantage	   to	   allow	   the	   coefficients	   to	   vary	   across	   individuals,	   but	   the	  
disadvantage	  of	  making	   the	  assumption	   that	   the	   short	   term	   relationship	   relation	  between	  
the	  variable	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  long	  term	  one	  (same	  coefficients).	  It	  is	  best	  adapted	  to	  the	  cases	  
in	  which	  both	  the	  N	  and	  T	  dimensions	  are	  high,	  therefore	  the	  tests	  is	  likely	  to	  suffer	  from	  size	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distortions	  in	  our	  small	  N	  model	  (the	  reason	  for	  which	  we	  didn’t	  consider	  it	  as	  our	  baseline	  
test).	  
Two	   kinds	   of	   statistics	   are	   introduced:	  group-­‐means	   statistics	   (that	   average	   the	   results	   of	  
individual	   country	   test	   statistics)	   and	   panel	   statistics	   (that	   pool	   the	   statistics	   along	   the	  
within-­‐dimension).	  Within	   each	   category,	   non-­‐parametric	   (phi	   and	   t)	   and	   parametric	   (ADF	  
and	  v)	  test	  statistics	  are	  presented.	  In	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  T	  is	  lower	  than	  100,	  Pedroni	  (2004)	  
reports	   that	   the	  ADF	   statistics	  have	   the	  best	  power,	  with	  v	   and	  phi	  performing	  worse.	  For	  
this	  reason,	  we	  focus	  only	  on	  the	  ADF	  and	  t	  statistics	  in	  our	  study.	  
The	   test	   accounts	   for	   cross-­‐sectional	   dependence	   by	   time-­‐demeaning	   the	   variable.	   We	  
naturally	  apply	  this	  method	  in	  our	  model,	  and	  we	  select	  the	  number	  of	  lags	  in	  the	  residual	  
analysis	  based	  on	  the	  AIC	  criteria,	  still	  departing	  from	  a	  maximum	  of	  4	  lags.	  Under	  the	  null	  
hypothesis	  of	  “no	  cointegration”,	  the	  test	  statistics	  are	  distributed	  N	  (0,1).	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Appendix	  4:	  Other	  empirical	  results	  
Cointegration	  tests,	  results	  in	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period:	  
	  
Table	  A2:	  Westerlunds	  tests	  for	  cointegration	  (2003m1	  –	  2008m8)	  
	   Westerlunds	  tests	  of	  cointegration	  
Basic	   Robust	   to	   cross-­‐sectional	  
dependence	  



















<	  1	  year	  
0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.001	   0.000	   0.016	  
Deposit	  
between	  
1	   and	   2	  
years	  
0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.004	   0.024	   0.000	   0.000	  
Deposit	  	  
>	  2	  years	  




<	  1	  year	  
0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.003	  
Deposit	  
between	  
1	   and	   2	  
years	  
0.000	   0.008	   0.000	   0.000	   0.001	   0.035	   0.000	   0.008	  
Deposit	  	  
>	  2	  years	  
0.005	   0.011	   0.000	   0.002	   0.168	   0.092	   0.175	   0.165	  
Note:	  The	  Ga	  and	  Gt	  test	  statistics	  test	  H0:	  ai	  =	  0	  for	  all	  i	  versus	  H1:	  ai	  <	  0	  for	  at	  least	  one	  i,	  where	  ai	  is	  the	  error	  correction	  
coefficient	   (see	  Westerlund	   (2007)	   and	   Appendix	   3).	   These	   statistics	   start	   from	   a	   weighted	   average	   of	   the	   individually	  
estimated	  ai's	  and	  their	  t-­‐ratio's	  respectively.	  Rejection	  of	  H0	  should	  be	  taken	  as	  evidence	  of	  cointegration	  of	  at	  least	  one	  of	  
the	  cross-­‐sectional	  units.	  The	  Pa	  and	  Pt	  test	  statistics	  pool	  information	  over	  all	  the	  cross-­‐sectional	  units	  to	  test	  H0:	  ai	  =	  0	  for	  
all	   i	   vs	   H1:	   	   ai	   <	   0	   for	   all	   i.	  We	   use	   an	   automatic	   selection	   of	   lags	   from	   the	   AIC	   criteria.	  We	   impose	   a	   constant	   in	   the	  
cointegration	   relationship	   as	   suggested	   by	   the	   theory.	   Following	   the	   literature,	   EURIBOR	   3	   months	   is	   used	   for	   the	  
cointegration	  relationship	  with	  deposits	  with	  a	  maturity	  lower	  1	  year	  (Deposit	  rates	  <	  1	  year),	  EURIBOR	  1	  year	  otherwise.	  
Similarly,	  OIS	  3	  months	  is	  used	  in	  our	  index	  for	  deposits	  with	  a	  maturity	  lower	  than	  1	  year,	  OIS	  1	  year	  otherwise.	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Table	  A3:	  Pedroni	  tests	  for	  cointegration,	  pre-­‐crisis	  period	  (2003m1	  –	  2008m9)	  
	  
	  






	   t	   t	   ADF	   t	   ADF	  
With	  EURIBOR	   Deposit	  <	  1	  year	  
	   -­‐1.833	   2.1	   1.11	   1.749	  
Deposit	  between	  1	  and	  2	  years	  
	   -­‐2.633	   -­‐2.288	   -­‐2.324	   -­‐1.89	  
Deposit	  >	  2	  years	  
	   -­‐2.308	   -­‐0.728	   -­‐2.394	   -­‐0.271	  
With	  our	  Index	   Deposit	  <	  1	  year	  
	   -­‐1.603	   -­‐0.29	   -­‐2.151	   -­‐0.141	  
Deposit	  between	  1	  and	  2	  years	  
	   -­‐4.234	   -­‐4.123	   -­‐3.889	   -­‐3.831	  
Deposit	  >	  2	  years	  
	   -­‐3.613	   -­‐3.536	   -­‐4.165	   -­‐3.933	  
The	  t-­‐stat	  must	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  N(0,1):	  if	  |	  t-­‐stat	  |	  >	  1,96	  then	  the	  null	  “no	  cointegration”	  is	  rejected	  at	  
the	  5%	  threshold,	  if	  |	  t-­‐stat	  |	  >	  2,57	  then	  the	  null	  is	  rejected	  at	  the	  1%	  threshold.	  
	  
Cointegration	  tests,	  results	  with	  the	  Pedroni	  test	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  period:	  
	  
Table	  A4:	  Pedroni	  tests	  for	  cointegration,	  post-­‐crisis	  period	  (2009m1	  –	  2015m1)	  
	  
	  






	   t	   t	   ADF	   t	   ADF	  
With	  EURIBOR	   Deposit	  <	  1	  year	  
	   -­‐1.005	   -­‐.1604	   -­‐1.301	   -­‐.6021	  
Deposit	  between	  1	  and	  2	  years	  
	   -­‐2.435	   -­‐.4885	   -­‐2.683	   -­‐.2137	  
Deposit	  >	  2	  years	  
	   -­‐2.11	   -­‐.2342	   -­‐2.687	   -­‐.4397	  
With	  our	  Index	   Deposit	  <	  1	  year	  
	   -­‐2.374	   -­‐1.853	   -­‐3.099	   -­‐3.106	  
Deposit	  between	  1	  and	  2	  years	  
	   -­‐3.654	   -­‐2.658	   -­‐3.928	   -­‐2.875	  
Deposit	  >	  2	  years	  
	   -­‐3.908	   -­‐1.2	   -­‐4.598	   -­‐1.781	  
Note:	   The	   t-­‐stat	  must	   be	   compared	   to	   the	   distribution	   of	   N(0,1):	   if	   |	   t-­‐stat	   |	   >	   1,96	   then	   the	   null	   “no	   cointegration”	   is	  
rejected	  at	  the	  5%	  threshold,	  if	  |	  t-­‐stat	  |	  >	  2,57	  then	  the	  null	  is	  rejected	  at	  the	  1%	  threshold.	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Appendix	  5:	  	  Pool-­‐mean	  Group	  estimates	  used	  for	  rates	  predictions	  
	  
We	  use	  the	  standard	  Panel	  Mean-­‐Group	  model	  of	  Pesaran	  and	  Smith	  (1995)	  to	  estimate	  the	  
relationship	   between	   deposit	   rates	   and	   the	   EURIBOR	   (respectively,	   our	   index)	   in	   the	   pre-­‐
crisis	   world.	   The	   use	   of	   an	   Error-­‐Correction	   Model	   is	   justified	   by	   the	   fact	   we	   find	  
cointegration	   between	   deposit	   rates	   and	   the	   EURIBOR	   (respectively	   our	   index)	   on	   that	  
period	  (Appendix	  4).	  The	  Pooled	  Mean-­‐Group	  model	  is	  favored	  over	  the	  Mean-­‐Group	  model	  
following	   the	   results	   from	   the	   standard	   Hausman	   test.	   The	   model	   estimated	   is	   thus	   the	  
following:	  
	   ∆𝑦!,! = 𝑐! + 𝑎 𝑦!,!!! − 𝛽𝑥!,!!! + 𝛼!,!∆𝑦!,!!!!!!! + 𝛾!,!∆𝑥!,!!!!!!!!! + 𝑢!,!	  	  
	  
with	  𝑦	  being	  deposit	  rates	  with	  a	  maturity	  lower	  than	  one	  year,	  𝑥	  our	  index	  in	  the	  model	  (A)	  
and	  the	  EURIBOR	  3	  months	  in	  the	  model	  (B).	  𝑎	  is	  the	  error-­‐correction	  coefficient,	  it	  provides	  
an	  estimate	  of	  the	  speed	  of	  error-­‐correction	  towards	  the	  long	  run	  equilibrium.	  The	  𝛼!,! 	  and	  𝛾!,! 	  coefficients	  take	  into	  account	  the	  short	  term	  adjustments:	  𝛼!,! 	  are	  the	  J	  coefficients	  for	  
the	  lags	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  (the	  first	  difference	  of	  deposit	  rates,	  D.dep_rate)	  and	  𝛾!,! 	  
the	  K	  coefficients	  for	  the	  lags	  of	  the	  first	  difference	  of	  the	  EURIBOR	  (D.EUR3m)	  or	  our	  index	  
(D.index).	  We	   set	   J	   =	   K	   =	   3	   for	   both	  models	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   simplicity.	   The	   results	   of	   the	  
Pooled	  Mean-­‐Group	   estimates	   are	   given	   in	   Table	   A5.	   Predictions	   are	   then	   built	   for	   each	  
country	  using	  the	  coefficients	  obtained	  here.	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Table	  A5:	  Pooled	  Mean-­‐Group	  regressions,	  our	  index	  (A)	  versus	  the	  EURIBOR	  (B),	  pre-­‐crisis	  
period	  (2003m1	  –	  2008m9)	  
	   (A)	   (B)	  
	   	   	  
EC	  term	   	   	  
a	  (ec	  coefficient)	   -­‐0.3024***	   -­‐0.2403***	  
	   (0.0863)	   (0.0807)	  
Index	  t-­‐1	   0.9050***	   	  
	   (0.0120)	   	  
EUR3m	  t-­‐1	   	   0.8891***	  
	   	   (0.0086)	  
Short	  term	  
coefficients	   	   	  
D.dep_rate	  t-­‐1	   0.1769***	   -­‐0.1083	  
	   (0.0598)	   (0.0792)	  
D.dep_rate	  t-­‐2	   0.1184	   0.0737	  
	   (0.0870)	   (0.0562)	  
D.dep_rate	  t-­‐3	   0.1172*	   0.1378***	  
	   (0.0698)	   (0.0453)	  
D.index	  t	   0.0439	   -­‐	  
	   (0.0327)	   	  
D.index	  t-­‐1	   0.0840**	   -­‐	  
	   (0.0409)	   	  
D.index	  t-­‐2	   -­‐0.1347**	   -­‐	  
	   (0.0611)	   	  
D.EUR3m	  t	   -­‐	   0.3234***	  
	   	   (0.0482)	  
D.EUR3m	  t-­‐1	   -­‐	   0.1998***	  
	   	   (0.0671)	  
D.EUR3m	  t-­‐2	   -­‐	   -­‐0.0005	  
	   	   (0.0729)	  
constant	   0.0464	   0.0203**	  
	   (0.0308)	   (0.0096)	  
N	   357	   408	  
Note:	   the	   dependent	   variable	   is	   the	   difference	   of	   deposit	   rates	   (D.deposit_rate	   t).	   Standard	   errors	   are	   in	  





Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.53
